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Abstract 
The spate of corporate failures in recent times calls for serious examination of their causes and possible solution. 
Audit committees are statutorily compulsory component of the management of corporate organizations in 
Nigeria (CAMA 1990) and constitute a credible component of corporate government element. For quite some 
time now, audit committees have been instituted to add teeth to corporate governance in publicly quoted 
companies. In spite of this, corporate failures are still rampant. It becomes necessary to ask: how significant is 
the contribution of the audit committees to corporate performance of quoted companies in the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. This paper therefore evaluates the relevance of the audit committee on corporate performance. It 
focuses on Non-Financial companies quoted in the Exchange between 2006 and 2010. It regresses the average 
perceived quality of the audit committees against critical financial ratios of these companies over the years 
covered. A sample size of 287 was selected using the Taro Yameni formula and the Microsoft Special Package 
for Social Sciences (SPSS) statistical analysis was adopted to perform the regression analysis. It was discovered 
that the quality of audit committee rather than its mere existence impacts on the performance of companies 
through a positive impact on corporate governance of such companies. However, for majority of the companies 
(more than 80 percent), their audit committees are weakly constituted with majority of the members lacking the 
necessary qualities of integrity, dedication, a thorough understanding of the business of the company among 
others. These qualities according to Shamsudden (2003) are the bedrock of or sterling qualities of audit 
committee membership. 
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1.INTRODUCTION 
The distinct characteristic of ‘divorced management from ownership’ of modern corporations, make stewardship 
accounting inevitable in company administration and management. Professional managers who (Wikipedia, 
2007) are considered more competent than the owners of the corporations and are thus hired to run and manage 
the affairs of the companies are expected to guarantee transparency accountability and fairness in their duties 
(Howard, 2000). This is a basic tenet of corporate governance. It is guaranteed by ensuring that various 
mechanisms are put in place to ensure seamlessness in accommodating corporate goal (ownership goal) and 
management goal in an enterprise. Tricker (1984) had distinguished management and control in the bid to 
explain corporate governance by asserting that if management is about running business, then governance in the 
corporate world is about seeing that companies are run properly. Hence corporate governance is concerned with 
ways in which all parties interested in the well-being of the firm, in order words the stakeholders, attempt to 
ensure that managers and other insiders take measures or adopt mechanisms that safeguard the interests of the 
stakeholders. Separation of duties usually depicted in an ‘organigram’, is not only a feature of good internal 
control but also an essential ingredient of good corporate governance.     
The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different 
participants in the firm including spelling out the rules and procedures for making decisions. Hence Wolfenson 
(1999), Uche (2004) and Akinsulire (2006) all agree that corporate governance provides the structure through 
which the company’s objectives are set and the strategies, the tactics and the means, of attaining those objectives 
and monitoring performance defined. Manne (1965) however, set the tone which was later made louder by 
Alchian and Demetz (1972) and Bonnier and Bruner (1989) to the effect that the Board of Directors (BOD) is the 
most important and possibly, the greatest beneficiary of all good mechanisms of internal control including 
corporate governance. However, there are other mechanisms of corporate governance, especially the audit 
committee, that play vital roles in ensuring smooth and efficient management and administration of companies. 
After all, according to Williams (2001), all stakeholders responsible for promoting sound corporate governance 
such as the board, the management, the audit committee and regulators are almost equally challenged by the 
recent failures in corporate governance in Nigeria and should be compelled to ensure that sound corporate 
governance exist. According to CAMA 1990, the audit committee is a committee of shareholders and non-
executive directors charged with the responsibility of liaising between the external auditors and the BOD on one 
hand, and between management and the external auditors on the other hand. The inclusion of this committee in 
the corporate governance mechanism raises the expectations of shareholders and the general public for enhanced 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.16, 2013 
 
116 
corporate governance and by extension increased performance of companies.  This raised confidence is 
predicated on perceived checkmating role of the Audit Committees in ensuring that the BOD lives up to 
expectation in fulfilling the globally accepted pillars of corporate governance, to wit, accountability, fairness, 
responsibility and transparency. But the rampant failure of corporate governance in Nigeria as manifested in 
corporate failures throw strong doubt on the effectiveness of audit committees in carrying out this role. 
Companies have gone under at alarming rate in Nigeria in recent times and while external factors (economic 
infrastructure especially power, legal architecture, fiscal policies et cetera) may not have been exonerated, much 
blame is on absence of strong commitment to the tenets of corporate governance of which Audit Committee is a 
critical element. Cadbury Plc, Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC), National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), 
Kaduna Textile Industry, Asaba Textile Industry, Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) Benue 
Cement Company Gboko, Niger Cement Company Nkalagu, Nigerian Coal Corporation (NCC), Leventis Plc, et 
cetera and several banks are some of the corporate failures in recent time in Nigeria for which strong questions 
have been raised on the failure of corporate governance. A logical question that arouses the curiosity of this 
researcher becomes: to what extent does audit committee positively impact on corporate governance and 
financial performance of companies in Nigeria? This paper addresses this question by evaluating the impact of 
audit committee on corporate performance in Nigeria and through testing of the hypothesis that there is no 
significant positive impact of audit committee on corporate performance in Nigeria. The paper is organized in 
five parts. . Part one of the paper introduces the work, part two contains the literature review, part three the 
methodology, while part four presents and discusses the findings and part five concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 AUDIT COMMITTEE 
According to CAMA 1990, the audit committee is a committee of shareholders and non-executive directors 
charged with the responsibility of liaising between the external auditors and the BOD on one hand, and between 
management and the external auditors on the other hand. Audit Committees are the most important recent 
development in the corporate governance structure and are expected to contribute significantly in this respect. 
Shamusdden (2003) opines that members of the committee should possess qualities such as integrity, dedication, 
and a thorough understanding of the business of the company. Moreover, the composition of the Audit 
Committee (AC) and the manner in which they exercise their governance and oversight responsibilities have a 
major impact on the overall internal control mechanism of a company. Expectedly, the independence of the AC 
from management, the level of accounting knowledge possessed by members, the experience and status of the 
members, the extent of their involvement and scrutiny of management activities, the appropriateness of their 
actions (for instance, the degree to which they raise and pursue difficult questions with management), all 
determine the efficiency and effectiveness of this committee. As an intermediary between the management and 
the external auditors, it is equally expected that an effective audit committee can enhance the independence and 
professional skepticism of an external auditor. Interestingly, the BOD and the AC exist in a mutually reinforcing 
symbiotic relationship. The effectiveness of one enhances the efficiency of the other since an effective AC helps 
to set a positive tone at the top. 
As for the relationship between the AC and the external auditor, the later should evaluate the effectiveness of the 
former as part of understanding the control environment and monitoring quality in the enterprise. Hence in 
evaluating the overall internal control efficiency in the company, the external auditor considers among other 
things; the independence of the AC from management; the clarity with which the AC’s responsibilities are 
articulated; how well the AC and management understand those responsibilities; the AC’s involvement and 
interaction with the independent auditor; the AC’s interaction with key members of financial management team; 
whether questions raised by the AC indicate an understanding of the critical accounting policies and judgmental 
accounting estimates; and the AC’s responsiveness to issues raised by the auditor. To the auditor therefore, 
Arens et al (2009), insist that ineffective oversight by the AC of the company’s external financial reporting 
should be regarded as at least, a significant deficiency and a strong indicator of a material weakness in internal 
control and corporate governance. In the same vein, the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission delists 
any company with an AC that: is not comprised solely of independent directors; is not solely responsible for 
hiring and firing of the company’s auditors; does not establish procedures for the receipt and treatment of 
complaints (e.g.  whistle blowing) regarding accounting, internal control or auditing matters; does not have the 
ability to engage its own independent counsel and other advisor; and is inadequately funded. 
2.2 Corporate Governance and the Audit Committee 
Corporate governance is synonymous with the responsibility associated with large scale artificial persons that 
lack the capacity to manage themselves (Salomon v Salomon and CO ltd, 1897). By vesting the day to day 
running of the entity to a team of directors and senior managers who are distinct from their owners, ownership 
becomes divorced from management necessitating the guarantee for transparency, accountability and fairness in 
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the management of the enterprise. Mayer, (2000) opines that corporate governance is about control and running 
of companies where concerns are raised as to who is in control, for how long and over what activities? Deakin 
and Hughes (1997) posit that corporate governance entails the connection between the internal control 
machinery of corporations and the general public’s notion of the scope of corporate accountability. Hence, it is a 
set of rules applicable to the direction and control of companies where however, management is seen to connote 
running a business and governance becomes ensuring that it is run properly (Tricker, 1984). Specifically, 
corporate governance creates a framework of goals and policies to guide an organization’s progress and forms a 
foundation for assessing Board and management performance (Adedotun, 2003). In a more elaborate tone, 
Oyediran (2003) stresses that corporate governance looks at the institutional and policy framework for 
management of corporation from the very beginnings, in entrepreneurship, through the government structures, 
company law, privatization, insolvency and to market exit. It not only depends on the legal, regulatory, 
institutional, environmental and societal interests of the communities in which it operates, but also has impact on 
the reputation and long-term success of a company.  
Much of efficient corporate governance also depends on the efficiency and effectiveness of internal control 
within the organization. After all; fraud, misappropriation, theft, waste of resources and non respect of the rights 
of all stakeholders are evidences of both weak internal control and poor corporate governance. And it is in 
response to the rise in fraud cases that the US Congress developed recommendations aimed at improving the 
effectiveness of the audit committee in publicly held companies in the United States. According to Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) (2003) the US Congress Report (2002), demands in addition to the independence 
of the members of the audit committees, that companies should disclose whether or not the audit committees 
include financial experts (and, if not, why not). A study carried out by Sarens et al (2009), concludes that 
financial expertise and the independence of audit committee members improve their effectiveness in reducing 
the likelihood of misappropriation of assets and overall tone of corporate governance in publicly held companies 
in the US. Along the same line, Moriceau (2004) and Chapple et al (2009) conclude from their separate studies 
also in the US, that the higher the percentage of independent members, the greater the effectiveness of the audit 
committee, and the longer the average tenure of audit committee members, the lower the incidence of 
misappropriation of assets. In addition, continue Chapple et al, the proportion of independent directors on the 
audit committee is inversely related to the incidence of misappropriation.  
According to Sezoort and Salterio (2001), and McDaniel et al (2002), financial expertise impacts audit 
committee member’s judgments and financial reporting-related outcome. Again experts tended to focus more on 
recurring, prominent issues. Xie et al (2003) examined the relationship between discretionary accruals as proxy 
for earnings management, and the background of audit committee members. They found that the proportion of 
audit committee members with corporate or investment banking background is negatively related to the level of 
earnings management. Hence an active and financially oriented audit committee may influence the level of 
earnings management and lower it drastically to the benefit of other stakeholders. This is undoubtedly a positive 
influence on corporate governance. Interestingly again, Abbot et al (2004) examined the impact of audit 
committee financial expertise on financial restatements while defining financial expertise to include certified 
public accountants, investment bankers, venture capitalists, chief financial officers, controller or someone who 
has held a senior management position with financial responsibilities, and found that firms with financial experts 
on the audit committees are less likely to experience financial reporting restatement. Even more acutely, Bedard 
et al (2004) found that the presence of at least one financial expert is negatively associated with aggressive 
earnings management. Just the same way as Agrawal and chadha (2005) found that the probability of restatement 
of financial statement is significantly lower when the audit committee has financial experts. Much of creative 
accounting could therefore be minimized by the presence of a credible audit committee composed by financial 
experts. In addition, Defond et al (2005), examined the ideal composition of audit committees and found that a 
favorable market reaction occurs whenever there is an announcement of the appointment of directors who are 
accounting experts, especially when other good governance attributes exist.  
 In any case, no empirical evidence has been established in Nigeria to the knowledge of these researchers as to 
the exact impact of audit committee composition on corporate governance and corporate performance. After all, 
corporate governance in Nigeria within the concept of company management and administration is seen as the 
exercise of power over the enterprise direction, the supervision and control of enterprise actions, the concern for 
the effect of the enterprise on other parties, the acceptance of a duty to be accountable and self-regulated within 
the status and jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. From the prism of the overall rights of 
shareholders to specific equitable treatment of marginal and minority shareholders which adequate corporate 
governance is expected to protect and guarantee, an oversight functioning body such as the Audit Committee 
should be a critical factor. The need for the Audit Committee to discharge its functions credibly as provided in 
the SEC’s Code of best practices of Corporate Governance (2003) should demand independent, accounting-
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knowledge compliant or broadly defined financial experts, external directors and shareholders, non-
compromising and alert members to constitute the Audit Committee.   
 Little wonder that the Code inter alia, provides for the existent of audit committees (compulsorily for large 
firms), the separation of the roles of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the BOD; determination of 
Executive Directors’ compensation by non-executive directors; schedule of matters reserved for the Board; the 
exclusion of non-executive directors in share option schemes and pension arrangements with the company; the 
establishment of a formal selection process for the appointment of non-executive directors as a matter for the 
entire board; disclosure in annual reports including Directors’ Reports on the effectiveness of the company’s 
system of internal control and the going concern status of the business. On its part, the CAMA i990 provides 
specifically that a public limited liability company should have an audit committee (maximum of six members of 
equal representation of three member each representing the management/directors and shareholders) in place. 
The Act goes further to assign responsibilities to the audit committee as follows;  working to ensure increased 
public confidence in the credibility and objectivity of published financial statements; assisting the directors, 
especially the non-executive directors, in meeting their responsibilities of financial reporting; and strengthening 
the independent position of a firm’s external auditors by providing an additional channel of communication. The 
functions assigned to the audit committee in the Act include the provision of oversight functions on effective 
internal control, reliable financial reporting, which must comply with regulatory requirements and corporate 
code of conduct. Audit committees are also expected to review not only external auditor’s reports but also the 
report of the internal auditor. In addition the committee is to maintain a constructive dialogue with external 
auditors and the board in order to enhance the credibility of financial disclosures. Therefore, a properly 
constituted audit committee that is both efficient and effective is expected to impact positively on both corporate 
governance and financial performance of a company.  
2.3 Corporate Performance 
The capacity and ability of a firm to use its assets to generate revenue from its primary mode of business depict 
its overall financial health. When this is measured periodically, it forms the basis for both horizontal and vertical 
analysis and comparison. According to Demsetz and Lehn (2004), financial performance involves measuring a 
firm’s policies and operations in monetary terms which are depicted in the firm’s return on investment, return on 
assets, value added, et cetera. That is, accounting profit ratios proxy corporate performance. Corporate 
governance has been found to correlate positively with corporate performance, (Attiye and Robina, 2007) both 
seen from these accounting ratios of the firm and the movement of its price in the stock market. While the 
accounting profit ratios are measured by the Accountant constrained only by the standards set by his profession, 
the performance as reflected by the movement of its price in the stock market is measured by the investors 
constrained by their acumen, information, optimism or pessimism and general psychology. In either case 
however, Young (2000) suggests that best governance practices exert a positive influence on firm performance 
since it prevents management and controlling investors from taking initiatives to expropriate minority investors. 
This, it is argued impacts positively on the firm’s goodwill and ability to attract equity capital from prospective 
marginal investors. Hence in considering approaches to measurement of firm level financial performance, Sanda 
et al (2003), insist that this is found in social science research based on market prices, accounting ratios and total 
factor profitability where market prices are readily obtained from national stock exchanges for all listed firms. 
While profit is a flow concept, profit margin measures the flow of profits over some period compared with 
revenue and costs and thus there could be gross profit margin, operating profit margin, return on equity et cetera. 
The relationship between corporate governance and firm’s financial performance stems from the understanding 
that economic value is driven by governance mechanisms such as the legal protection of capital, the firm’s 
competitive environment, its ownership structure, CEO-Duality, board composition and size, (the focus of this 
paper), existence of Audit Committee and financial policy (Uadiele, 2010). In this light, Gompers et al (2003) 
find that stock returns are higher for firms with strong shareholder rights as compared to firms with weak 
shareholder rights. This suggests that firms with stronger or better corporate governance provisions outperform 
those with poor governance provisions in terms of profits, capital acquisition and sales growth. They also add 
that there is substantial evidence showing that weakly governed firms experience lower performance based on 
operating performance measures, lower sales growth and net profit margins. This has been corroborated by 
Khatab et al (2011) from a study of twenty listed firms in the Karachi Stock Exchange in Pakistan. 
2.4 Assessment of Current Corporate Governance Issues and Corporate Performance in Nigeria. 
Whereas in the United Kingdom approaches to best practices in corporate governance reflect a deep appreciation 
that governance should promote both accountability to shareholders and the board’s ability to manage the 
company effectively and efficiently the situation in Nigeria has been different. For instance, the key features of 
the UK best practices codified by the country’s company law and the listing rules demand inter alia;  a unitary 
board with members  collectively responsible for leading the company; division of powers at the apex of the 
company hierarchy, emphasizing the distinction between running the board by the Chairman and running the 
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company by the CEO; a balance of executive and independent non-executive directors where for larger 
companies, at least 50% of the board members should by independent non-executive directors and for smaller 
companies at least two independent directors; formal and transparent procedures for appointing directors, with 
all appointments ratified by shareholders; regular evaluation of the effectiveness of the board and its committees; 
formal and transparent procedures for setting executive remuneration, including a remuneration committee made 
up of independent directors and an advisory vote for shareholders; and a significant proportion of executive 
remuneration linked to performance. The illicit activities and insider dealings of most Nigerian Bank Chief 
Executives and directors as revealed by the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2009 shows a striking 
different scenario and summarize the level of decadence in corporate governance in Nigerian companies. 
Corporate governance is yet at a rudimentary stage in Nigeria with less than 40% of quoted companies including 
banks having recognized the codes of corporate governance, (CBN, 2006). But Nganga et el (2003) insist that 
corporate governance is a crucial ingredient in the process of encouraging domestic investment as well as inflow 
of foreign direct investment in Nigeria. They further lament that corporate governance practices in Nigeria 
reflect systemic governance problems including the inability to ensure effective capacity, constraints by 
administrators and ineffective implementation of laws. This leads to limited economic growth (Suberu and 
Aremu, 2010). And in realization of the need to align with international best practices, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in collaboration with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), inaugurated a 
seventeen (17) member committee in June 2000 in Nigeria headed by Atedo Peterside, to review and identify 
weaknesses in the current corporate governance practices in Nigeria and make recommendations for 
improvement. According to Inyang (2009), the members of the committee were selected to cut across relevant 
sectors of the economy including members of professional organization, the private sector and regulatory 
agencies. The committee submitted a draft code, which was widely publicized throughout the country and 
reviewed in major financial centers of Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt to elicit stakeholders’ input prior to 
finalization. The final report was approved in 2003 by the boards of SEC and CAC. The release of the 2003 code 
marked a watershed in the development of good corporate governance practices in Nigeria. Essentially, the Code 
stipulated among other things, the appointment of audit committee especially for large firms in a manner or 
composition to ensure diversity of experience without compromising financial expertise, integrity, availability 
and independence. It remains to be seen how far these provisions are being implemented. It also remains to be 
ascertained, the extent to which the roles of the audit committees as stipulated in the Code, to wit:  the provision 
of oversight functions on effective internal control, reliable financial reporting, which must comply with 
regulatory requirements and corporate code of conduct; are being carried out in non-financial companies quoted 
in the Nigerian Stock Exchange.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
The paper adopts a survey design. The population of the study is made up of all the non-financial companies 
quoted in the Nigerian stock exchange within the period covered by the study. Using the Taro Yameni formula at 
95 percent confidence level and error margin of 0.05, a sample size of 72 is selected. In each company three 
persons (managers/Accountants) are asked to fill out the questionnaire. Through cluster random sampling, 
sample elements representing all the sections of the non-financial companies were picked from the sample 
frame. To enhance the robustness of the findings, an oral interview was conducted on the sampled firms. The 
interview guide established the existence of the audit committee, the composition of the committee, the existence 
of procedures and duties of the committee, the functioning of the committee, the relationship and communication 
channel between the committee and the external auditor on one hand and the board on the other, the quality of 
the oversight function on the production of financial reports et cetera. Responses were reduced into a 5-point 
Linker scale and analyzed using the Microsoft Special Package for Social Sciences. 
 
4. DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Perceived Impact of Audit Committee on Corporate Governance and Performance. 
Data presented on table 4.1 in Appendix 1 
Evidence from table 4.1 shows that the respondents agree that the presence of Audit Committees provide an 
additional channel of communication in companies and this strengthens the independence of the external 
auditors. The average of 4.46 is closest to the linkert scale of 4 which represents ‘Agree’. In the same vein, the 
average of 4.17 indicates an agreement of the respondents that the activities of Audit Committees promote 
increasing public confidence in the credibility and objectivity of published financial statements of companies and 
this positively impacts the corporate governance tone of companies and their financial performance. Equally 
shown is the average of 4.28 signifying an agreement to the fact that the inclusion of financial experts 
(Accountants and allied professionals) in the Audit Committee strengthens the reporting and auditing functions 
in the firm. Essentially too, the respondents agree (3.66 also closest to the 4 mark in the scale) that Audit 
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Committee provides the necessary oversight functions on effective internal control, reliable financial reporting 
that complies with statutory and regulatory requirements including corporate code of conduct, all geared towards 
boosting corporate governance and performance. Again the average of 3.74 recorded by the respondents 
indicates that the audit committee’s oversight roles significantly reduce financial imprudence, unethical practices 
and material misstatements. On the whole the average of 4.6 signifies an overall agreement to the positive impact 
of Audit Committees on corporate governance and performance of companies quoted in the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. This result is further corroborated through a hypothesis test using the X2- Chi-square test statistics 
thus: 
4.2 Test of hypothesis. 
Null hypothesis: Audit Committee Size and Composition do not have significant positive effect on the corporate 
performance of quoted non financial companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.  
REGRESSION  
Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. Deviation N 
corporate performance 2.1852 1.28832 864 
Audit commitee size 
and composition 1.9780 1.17159 864 
Correlations 
    
corporate 
performance 
Audit 
commitee size 
and 
composition 
Pearson Correlation corporate performance 1.000 .687 
Audit commitee size 
and composition .687 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) corporate performance . .000 
Audit commitee size 
and composition .000 . 
N corporate performance 864 864 
Audit commitee size 
and composition 864 864 
Model Summary(b) 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .687(a) .472 .471 .93705 .108 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Audit commitee size and composition 
b  Dependent Variable: corporate performance 
ANOVA(b) 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 675.482 1 675.482 769.287 .000(a) 
Residual 756.889 862 .878     
Total 1432.370 863       
a  Predictors: (Constant), Audit commitee size and composition 
b  Dependent Variable: corporate performance 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.4, No.16, 2013 
 
121 
Coefficients(a) 
Model   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error 
1 (Constant) .692 .063   11.050 .000 
Audit commitee size 
and composition .755 .027 .687 27.736 .000 
a  Dependent Variable: corporate performance 
TABLE 4.2 SPSS RESULT ON THE  EFFECT OF ACSC ON CP 
Particulars R R2 Adj. 
R2 
DW Standard Coefficients F Sig 
Beta T- Value 
All Firms 0.687(a) 0.472 0.471 .108 0.687 27.736 769.287 0.000 
NOTE: 
R = Correlation Coefficient or Beta 
R2 = Coefficient of Determination 
Adj. R2 = Adjusted Coefficient of Determination 
DW = Durbin Watson (d) test statistic 
T-value =  Student t- test Statistic 
F = F- test statistic 
Interpretation on corporate performance: 
The regression sum of squares (675.482) is less than the residual sum of squares (756.889), which indicates that 
more of the variation in the dependent variable is not explained by the model.  The significance value of the F 
statistics (0.000) is less than 0.05, which means that the variation explained by the model is not due to chance. 
R, the correlation coefficient which has a value of 0.687, indicates that there is a significant  relationship 
between the Audit committee size and composition  and corporate performance.  R square, the coefficient of 
determination, shows that 47.2% of the variation in the corporate performance is explained by the model. 
With the linear regression model, the error of estimate is high, with a value of about 0.93705.  The Durbin 
Watson statistics of .108, which is not up to 2, indicates that there is no autocorrelation. 
The audit committee size and composition coefficient of 0.755 indicates a positive significance between audit 
committee size and composition coefficient, which is statistically significant (with t = 27.736).  Therefore, the 
null hypothesis should be rejected and the alternative hypothesis accordingly accepted. The perception of the 
respondents therefore, is that the composition of the audit committees by mainly shareholders and non executive 
directors can hardly have any significant relationship with profit margin. But they opine that a more closely 
relationship could exist between audit committee role and the return on equity of the companies. This is 
explained from the oversight function over internal control and internal audit activities by the audit committees 
which go a long way to ensure more efficient application and effective control of resources.  Wrongly composed 
and inefficient audit committee would therefore negatively affect the return on equity of the companies. This 
corroborates earlier studies by ‘Klein (2002), Mansi and Reeb (2004), Kajola (2008) and Laib et al (2011). The 
perception is that a properly constituted audit committee of not less than 10 members and of proven financial 
competence, integrity and experience would impact more positively on the performance of companies. Such a 
large committee can be further broken into subcommittees to ensure proper coverage of the activities of the 
company all year round. This would ensure closer and timelier oversight functions over the internal control, 
accounting and auditing activities in the company. An audit committee constituted normally by shareholders and 
non-executive directors may mistakenly perform its duties like external auditors or simply an after-the-fact 
operator. To be more effective, audit committees have to bring value to the system by getting involved in the real 
time operations of the enterprise- prepayment audit, operational review, et cetera.  The audit committee needs to 
be fully involved in the entire gamut of the financial management of the company – planning and programming, 
budgeting, execution/implementation and recording/accounting and audit and evaluation.   
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Opinion survey suggests a strong relationship between the role and functions of a properly constituted audit 
committee and the corporate governance and performance of listed companies on the Nigerian Stock Market. 
However, empirical evidence from secondary data on the profit margin and return on equity of these companies 
fail to show such robust relationship. The implication is that audit committees of these companies are yet to rise 
to the occasion in terms of proper oversight function over the accounting and auditing functions of these 
companies. Though in compliance with statutory and regulatory provisions, the companies have audit committee 
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members constituted by mainly shareholders and non-executive directors, the other qualities of would be 
members are not sufficiently considered. Hence not all the audit committees have proven financial competence, 
integrity, experience and availability as basic criteria for selection of their membership. The BOD in practice 
does not properly constitute the audit committee membership. The board is said to have influenced greatly, the 
appointment of audit committee members even when the exercise is done at the floor of the Annual General 
Meeting of the company. This practice is inimical to proper functioning of an audit committee and the result is a 
rubber-stamp kind of audit committee. Under the prevailing circumstance therefore, the audit committee can 
hardly function properly to impact positively on both good corporate governance and financial performance of 
the company it is meant to serve. An efficient Audit Committee is a sin qua non to proper accountability, 
transparency and hence good corporate governance. Appointment of members should be devoid of political or 
selfish interests as the overall maximization of shareholders wealth should be the overriding objective in 
constituting the membership of Audit Committees. The independence and integrity of the audit committee 
directly influences the independence and objectivity of the external auditor and rubs off positively on the 
confidence of present and potential investors in the company. This paper recommends that the entire legal and 
regulatory framework together with the necessary institutional and environmental architecture for proper 
constitution and operation of an efficient Audit Committee should be maintained at all times to enhance 
corporate governance and improve financial performance of listed companies on the Nigerian Stock Market. 
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Table 4.1 Perceived Impact of Audit Committee on Corporate Governance and Performance of Quoted Non 
Financial Companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
S/N PERCEIVED 
IMPACT 
NO  SA(5) A(4) NI(3) DA(2) SDA(1) TOTAL MEAN 
1 Provides an additional 
channel of 
communication  
216 130(650) 70(280) 5(15) 7(14) 4(4) 963 4.46 
2 Checks the excesses of 
the Board 
216 78(390) 100(400) 6(18) 28(56) 4(4) 868 4.02 
3 Helps to detect fraud 216 70(350) 98(392) 5(15) 37(74) 6(6) 837 3.88 
4 Strengthens the 
independence of the 
external auditor   
216 100(500) 90(360) 4(12) 10(20) 2(2) 894 4.14 
5 Improves the net profit 
margin of the firm 
216 60(300) 93(372) 5(15) 47(94) 11(11) 794 3.67 
6 Significantly improves 
the Earning Per Share 
216 55(275) 83(332) 10(30) 48(96) 20(20) 753 3.49 
7  Significantly affects 
the dividend per share. 
216 56(280) 96(384) 6(18) 48(96) 10(10) 788 3.65 
8 Promotes increasing 
public confidence in 
the credibility and 
objectivity of 
published financial 
statements, thus 
boosting corporate 
performance. 
216 99(495) 82(328) 15(45) 12(24) 8(8) 900 4.17 
9 Presence of financial 
experts in the 
committee strengthens 
the reporting and 
auditing functions in 
the firm. 
216 100(500) 90(360) 15(45) 8(16) 3(3) 924 4.28 
10 Provide oversight 
functions on effective 
internal control, 
reliable financial 
reporting and thus 
significantly boosts 
corporate 
performance. 
216 63(315) 88(362) 5(15) 40(80) 20(20) 792 3.66 
11 Significantly reduces 
financial imprudence, 
unethical practices and 
material misstatements 
through its oversight 
role. 
216 66(330) 90(360) 4(12) 44(88) 18(18) 808 3.74 
 Average        3.92 
Source: Field survey 2013. SA=STRONGLY AGREE; A=AGREE; NI=NO IDEA; DA=DISAGREE; 
SDA=STRONGLY DISAGREE 
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